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extinguished and the ship then proceeded without lights. Her course was steered to pass through Cheung Chau Channel towards Hongkong. Her course was then altered to pass through the West Lamma Channel and eastwards, passing South of Waglan Lighthouse about 2 miles. The time would then be about midnight. The course of the ship was steered eastward until about 3 a.m. when the course was set to pass through Sam Mun Channel where she arrived about 5 a.m., and thence to Bias Bay.
On the departure of the pirates the Chief Officer took charge of the ship and navigated her back to Hongkong where assistance was rendered.
3.-Opportunities for reporting the ship en route.
The passage of the ship during the piracy was not observed either from Cheung Chau Police Station nor from Waglan Lighthouse nor from the Chinese Maritime Customs Station at Sam Mun. The ship did not meet any patrol launch of the Hongkong Water Police. In our opinion no blaine attaches to anyone on this account.
4. Action by the Secretary of the Hongkong, Canton and Macao Steamboat Company, Limited.
The ship was overdue in Hongkong at 10 p.m. on the 19th November. The fact of the late arrival of the ship did not arouse immediate alarm on her account since there had been occasions when such delay had been caused through inability, on account of lack of water, to crose the mud-flats outside Macao Harbour. The Eastern Extension Telegraph Company's office in Macao at that hour was closed, and it was not possible to ascertain by cable whether the ship had in fact left her port of departure. Relief measures were therefore not organized by the Secretary of the Company until 9 a.m. on the 20th November, when telegraphic information had reached him from Macao. We cannot see that, with the information and resources at his disposal, the Secretary could have taken any more effective action.
5. Conduct of the Master and other Certificated Officers of the ship during the attack.
In our opinion Captain Birss acted in a proper manner, When he found that a piratical attack was being made, he attempted to reach the bridge with all despatch as the position to be defended by the guard. He was unfortunately shot down before he could reach this protected area.
The Chief Officer, Mr. Copland, had only joined the ship three days before.
He was on duty on the bridge. Apparently he had no time to realise the attack of the pirates until they had practically reached the bridge, and he was put out of action by a blow on the head from a revolver.
The Chief Engineer, Mr. Cullen, was in his cabin on the boat deck on the port side. He was captured by the pirates and secured on the bridge.
The Second Engineer, Mr. Harman, was on duty in the engine room. The engine. room was entered by armed men who covered him with their firearms. He continued to superintend the engines under compulsion. In our opinion he had no option but to do so, and we are satisfied that if Mr. Harman had seen any way to change the situation, he would have teade an attempt.
6.--Conduct of the ship's guards during the attack. The behaviour of the ship's guards appears to have been excellent.
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7.-Observance of the Piracy Regulations in connection with the ship.
(1.) BY THE OWNERS.
(a.)-Construction.
Regulation No. 1 which requires that "Dodgers constructed of bullet proof material shall be erected on the bridge deck aft of the wheel house was observed.
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Regulation No. 2 provides that "A strong and substantial grille of expanded metal or barbed wire shall be strongly and substantially erected across the ship aft of the line of the dodgers." This regulation was not observed. In lieu of the prescribed grille to be erected across the ship, two grilles were erected at the after end of the smoking room on the hoat deck, intended to close the deck on the port and starboard side of the smoking
room.
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Regulations Nos. 3 and 4 which relate to "barbed wire were observed.
Regulation No. 5 directs that " Any access provided to the bridge deck from below shall be aft of the grille except by special permission of the Harbour Master signified in writing." In fact access to the bridge deck was provided forward of the grille, through the smoking room.
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Regulation No. 6 requires that "Every entrance to the engine and boiler rooms No shall he provided with strong and substantial solid metal or metal grille doors,' grille was provided to the engine room on the boat deck.
Regulation No. 7 which relates to steam hose on the navigating bridge" was
observed.
Regulation No. 8 which requires direct access to the bridge deck from the engine and boiler rooms was also observed.
By Regulation No. 9 a locked baggage room is required for the heavy baggage of the first and second class passengers. No such baggage room was provided.
By Regulation No. 10 The accommodation for passengers other than those of the first class shall be of such a nature that it can be isolated from the rest of the ship and from the crew and can be entered only by means of metal grille doors." This Regula- tion was sufficiently observed on the main deck. No attempt was made to observe it as between second class passengers on the main deck and the first class passengers who were using the hoat deck above.
The fastenings and locks required by Regulation No. 11 for the the ship's holds were duly provided.
Regulation No. 12 relates to the lisposition of deck cargo and was not observed. No blame whatever attaches to the owners of the ship in respect of any omission here recorded to observe these Regulations.
Regulation No. 13 contemplates the relaxation of any of these requirements by the Harbour Master who must certify his satisfaction with the constructional arrangements of the ship. The Harbour Master duly issued his certificate in respect of this ship.
(b).-Equipment.
The ship was fully equipped by her owners with arms, rockets, etc., as required by Regulations Nos. 14 and 15.
The number of guards employed was six, being two in excess of the number required by the Regulations.
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